★ 风----险 ★

ytlcorp

虽然这篇文章的确不是我写的，但是某国外网友的作品.
先感谢这位国外网友的精致作品.


我把风险分几个层次做一些延伸性的探讨，结果是非常意外的。
　　
　　第一层次的风险----对股市的一无所知
　　第二层次的风险----对股市的一知半解
　　第三层次的风险----对股市本来只有一知半解却“自以为”已经全知全解
　　第四层次的风险----身处风险的包围之中却对风险本身缺乏“自觉”

第一层次的风险----对股市的一无所知：表面上这种风险是巨大的，这完全是一种赌徒的心态，把股市视为纯粹的赌场就好象押大小（赌涨跌），但成败的概率几乎是对待的（当然如果考虑交易成本长期来说这是一场必输无疑的游戏），但在我看来这是股市中最小的一种风险。

第二层次的风险----对股市的一知半解：我始终认为对股市的一知半解比对股市的一无所知具有更大的风险，他们是股市中因各种骗局、陷阱而受害的主体。股市行为必然是一个让人困惑的行为，否则稍懂一点知识的人就能获利。市场中只要有人思考就会有人提供思考的素材（包装或造假的动机因此而生）和门类齐全的各类理念或技术（所谓不同时段的赢利模式），并以此来影响大众的意识与行为（骗局、陷阱就在这一过程中酝酿）。股市中人都是利益至上的主谁都想战胜别人、战胜市场，股市中人的学习动机与学习自觉性是最强烈的，但他们学到的东西大多数反而是对自己有害的，动机与结果的背离在股市中是非常普遍的现象，在我们面对“七亏二平一赢”的命运时为什么还有那么多人义无反顾的进入呢？----因为谁都认为自己是聪明人或懂得（独门）知识与技术、谁都认为自己能成为那10%之中的一员，10%的诱惑却对市场参与者产生100%的效应，这都是“一知半解”惹的祸。德高望重的经济学家吴敬琏教授说中国目前的股市“比赌场还黑”，其实吴老只说对了一半，在世界范围内的大多数股市在大多数时间里都比赌场还黑，这不是中国特色也许是股市的本质特征之一吧。　

第三层次的风险----对股市本来只有一知半解却“自以为”已经全知全解了：我将其视为风险中的较高层次，这种风险的杀伤力是毁灭性的，有人说“股市是消灭狂人的地方”就是对这种风险的最好诠释，我就把股市中的狂人理解为那些只有一知半解却“自以为”已经全知全解了的人。回顾历史我们会发现有人在相当长的时间周期中连续的、坚定的犯错误，其实市场中没人会去主动的犯错误，他们在“狂”的心态下当时肯定是在“自以为”的信心倍增的做着正确的决策（事后看只不过是在信心倍增的犯错误）。这类风险的主体是那些拥有一定特权、拥有强大资金或背景、以及过去在相当长的时间里的屡获成功的机构或个人，在中国的“中经开”就是一个典型（“自以为”对中国特色已经全知全解了）。

第四层次的风险----身处风险的包围之中却对风险本身缺乏“自觉”：其实市场中人没谁把股市视为“纯粹”的赌场（如果真那么做我们面对的风险反而会更小些），我们没有发现有谁凭感觉或靠飞膘来选股的，我们选股的动力主要来源于五花八门的消息或各类分析（基本面分析或技术面分析），我们每时每刻都处于第二层次与第三层次的风险之中，但最极端的风险（我将其视为风险中的最高境界）是身处风险的包围之中却对风险本身缺乏“自觉”。　　看完上面的分析我自己都目瞪口呆：这股市简直就是一个大坟场。其实我并没有如此悲观，做为股市之人毕竟还能通过“有所作为”来改变自己的处境，首先要明确自己对市场的认识永远处于“一知半解”的程度，把对“全知全解”的渴望视为一个远期的目标，并在对这一目标的追求过程中反思自我、把握机会。就我的判断股市中人赚钱的经历大多发生在初入股市的时候或者说初入股市的人具有更多的赚钱机会,这是不是在一定程度上证明了第一层次的风险是最小的呢?记得兄曾做过一个调查得出的结论是股市赚钱与否与学历和经验(入场的早晚)并无关系,或者说对一个具有高学历与早期入市具有很多经验的投资者而言相对那些对股市一无所知的人并没有体现出来什么优势, 这是不是在一定程度上证明了知识或技术自身所具有的风险平衡掉了它可能会带给我们的好处呢?国外流行的所谓指数化投资(所谓的随机漫步)似乎体现出对股市一无所知的一种认同,这是不是有意识的选择了一种最低风险的投资之道呢?自以为知道”的内涵太丰富了,只要进行足够的延伸也许我们之间并不矛盾,比如:

　　自以为知道---我不可能知道所有的东西
　　自以为知道---我是可能犯错误的人
　　自以为知道---我不是最聪明的人
　　自以为知道---我首先是大众中的一员然后才可能是那10%中的另一员
　　自以为知道---......

直到发现如果总是这样，我们会总是陷入左右为难的境地，每个决策之前都会感到难、难、难。于是我们知道，要学会计算，学会知道我们永远只能面对有限危险，学会。。。。
　　

[ 本帖最后由 ytlcorp 于 24-9-2005 04:04 PM 编辑 ]

secondbrother

我发觉很多人买股票的时候，都是当他门开始研究 "某某" 股票过后。当他门开始对"某某" 股票有一点认识的时候，他们就以为他们真的了解"某某" 股票。

由其是当他们知道"某某" 股票是一低PE交易时，加上高ROE。"某某" 股票真的如痴如醉，以为自己 find a hidden gem.
哈...哈。。以为买股票真的如此容易

W Buffett, 注意了银（Silver)很旧才买下它的。这个才叫认识。

留意股票一段时间后，当它真的是 bargain buy 才下手才是高招。

secondbrother

我也曾经犯下同样的错误，低PE 高ROE，真的无法抗拒。

以为自己是其中最早发现这hidden gem 的人之一....ha..ha...原来自己是"猪头"。如果真的 bargain buy 那里还轮到我...

以为如果现在不买，就会错失机会，那里知道......

我只是比一些人更早犯下同样的错误罢了。哈...哈.....

MY1

原帖由 secondbrother 于 26-9-2005 11:47 AM 发表
我也曾经犯下同样的错误，低PE 高ROE，真的无法抗拒。

以为自己是其中最早发现这hidden gem 的人之一....ha..ha...原来自己是"猪头"。如果真的 bargain buy 那里还轮到我...

以为如果现在不买，就 ...

有同感。我也做过猪头，还很啊Q的说其他人走宝了，结果越买越低，结果也不用说了。

ytlcorp

再看一下 一遍"个人心理上所承担风险（英文板）"

“One of the most often overlooked factors in attempts to measure risk is that we perceive it differently in disparate contexts. As a result, both the concept and tolerance for risk fluctuates over the course of an indi­vidual's lifetime. In addition, research suggests that our risk-seeking capacity may vary from one area of life to another. The Olympic skiers hurtling down a mountain at eighty-five miles per hour are taking huge risks with their bodies but probably perceive that risk very dif­ferently than those who are watching on television. Yet these same athletes may perceive conservative investing as a high-risk activity. The many members of the investment community who were mur­dered in the World Trade Center attack perceived little risk in work­ing every day 1,100 feet above the ground, but after September 11, everyone saw things differently.

Imagine for a minute that you are a hiker lost in the woods, trying to find your way back to civilization. You become hyper-vigilant. Every sound becomes a potential danger or possible clue to escape. You try to
discern oncoming weather patterns, worry about darkness overtaking you, or wonder whether someone missing you has sent out a search party. You listen for helicopters above. You begin to plan how you are going to survive the night, whether you have enough warm clothes, whether you should stay put or keep moving. Compare these feelings with the serenity of hiking in the same woods on a beautiful fall day under normal conditions, knowing exactly where you are and enjoying the changing foliage, listening to the birds, feeling the crack­ling leaves underfoot, observing how fast the clouds are moving, and being conscious of your muscles coordinating a steady push toward your destination. The experience of context causes a totally different perception and capacity to assume risk. Because you perceive the envi­ronment so differently in disparate contexts, you are likely to think of your risk capacity very differently.

When lost in the woods, depending on your mood, you may be ter­rified to take on any significant risk, or you may feel that failing to take on extra risk will worsen a dangerous situation. On the other hand, when you are sure of yourself, knowing where you are, and enjoying your immersion in the woods, you may not even notice that risky choices exist; the chances of anything dire happening feel remote. Being alert to danger is the furthest thing from your mind. While per­haps oversimplified, this example shows that not only will your capac­ity for risk be different in each scenario, but your actual level of risky behavior will also change in each context.

Since psychological perception of risk influences risk-seeking and risk aversion, perhaps your investor self is wondering about some of the contexts that influence our perception of market risk and capacity for managing it.

Relationships. It is no secret that investors with a strong sense of self experience themselves as more independent-minded than those with low self-esteem and low confidence. Because people often seek out relationships that function to strengthen their sense of self, the nature of our relationships can alter our capacity for risk. For example, a client who has a strong, trusting, and supportive relationship with a financial adviser frequently has more risk-seeking capacity than a client who is less sure of his relationship with his adviser. It follows that a change in advisers can significantly alter an investor's capacity for risk and perception of that capacity.

Support from family and significant others or the loss of significant relationships also can enhance or play havoc with our abil­ity to take on financial risk.

Investing Style. At different periods of our lives, we may assume very different investing styles. These disparate approaches to the market can be influenced by psychological changes, available time, interest in the market, losses, changes in family constellations, and so on. For example, at one phase of life, before becoming experienced with investments or interested in market information, we may follow the advice of the popular magazines, which are geared to informationless trading and emphasize diversification and index funds as a valid invest­ment strategy. But as life events add to our maturity, we may move from disinterest in the markets to a passion for investing. This may stimulate us to revisit our former emphasis on diversification.

In August 1934, John Maynard wrote to his business asso­ciate, F. C. Scott:
“As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. . . . One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence.”

Warren Buffett, who quoted Keynes's letter in one of his annual reports (which should serve as a brilliant course in investing strategy), follows Keynes's philosophy:
“The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it.”

As our investment style matures along the lines suggested by Keynes and Buffett, our capacity for risk may also increase to accept higher concentration levels. Or our risk capacity may decrease for other psychological reasons. In either case, our risk capacity cannot be assumed to correlate to some mythical age requirement that says as we grow older and head toward retirement we should become more risk­-averse. The truth is that there are many investors who should become more risk-seeking as they get closer to retirement because their idio­syncratic psychology and life context allow them to feel more com­fortable with greater risk.

Safety Nets. Another contextual determinant of risk capacity is our changing safety nets. I've often thought that investing in turbulent times is a little like hiking in the alpine zone of the White Mountains. The Mt. Washington area offers an intriguing juxtaposition of rap­idly changing weather patterns. You feel exposed to harsh and dan­gerous weather one moment but experience a peculiar sense of being part of several million years of evolution telescoped into a few moments of warm tranquility and peace several minutes later. After enough years of hiking in that alpine zone, one learns to take hats, gloves, jacket, and long underwear along with shorts and T-shirts, even in August.

Investing is a long way from mountain hiking, but its rhythms have a similar cadence, especially in volatile markets. One minute we feel surrounded by ominous clouds, and the next minute everything feels right with the world and investing seems deceptively easy. How much risk you can assume in the mountains depends not just on the season, but also on the competence of your hiking companions, your knowl­edge of the terrain, and your equipment. How much risk you can assume in the market also depends on your safety nets. These include your knowledge of your individual holdings, your trust in those who recommended them or the management that controls them, the supportive relationships in your life, and the inner resources (your psychological equipment) currently available to tolerate sudden disruptions or threats to their business. The important point is that these are not static qualities. Since they're constantly in flux, knowing your current safety nets is as important as carefully choosing your stocks.”

ytlcorp

Bingo!
Low Pe 不能真正反映到股价处于bargain buy，只是毫无意义的数字.
一些Low Pe 有可能受到disposal NTA gain 影响，公司前景暗淡等。

虽然 ROE的变化无穷, High ROE 也不能真正放映到公司具备有优势竞争力.
ROE = (Net Income/Sales) X (Sales/Average Assets) X (Average Assets/Average Equity)
ROE = (Assets/Equity) x (sales/Assets) x (EBIT-Taxes/Sales) x
(EBIT--Taxes - Interest/EBIT - Taxes)
Return on Equity = (Net Profit Margin) (Asset Turnover) (Equity Multiplier).

分析的基础在于逻辑和哲学或态度(悲观或者乐观)
什么时候该去思考乐观，什么时候该去思考悲观，这个问题本身就是最高层次的思考.

secondbrother

PE ＆ ROE 只是一个开始，正如 accounting 里的EPS 和 NTA。

在股票市场打滚的越旧，PE & ROE 对你越没有什么音响。因为你知道还有其它因素要考虑的。

正如 ytlcorp兄 说的，低PE是有其它原因的，不然它会在低PE交易吗？？

试问又有几个人能看破 PE 和 ROE 呢？看破这些数字的游戏？？

ytlcorp兄，你是少数之一。

拜读了一些书籍，其中有说道，人们总是很喜欢把简单的东西复杂化。

葉孤一座城

原帖由 secondbrother 于 26-9-2005 11:47 AM 发表
我也曾经犯下同样的错误，低PE 高ROE，真的无法抗拒。

以为自己是其中最早发现这hidden gem 的人之一....ha..ha...原来自己是"猪头"。如果真的 bargain buy 那里还轮到我...

以为如果现在不买，就 ...

请问你犯的错误在哪里？请明言那一支股票让你无法抗拒而又犯错了。

有话请直说。

我不是在看粤语残片。

ytlcorp

谢谢，二哥你.
我只是在学习中，还不能称为少数之一.

原帖由 NeverGiveUp 于 1-10-2005 06:16 PM 发表
拜读了一些书籍，其中有说道，人们总是很喜欢把简单的东西复杂化。

谁说人们总是很喜欢把简单的东西复杂化在股票方面？
真是笑话。
这句话只会是这里的人讲？
请阅读所有国外投资大师及国内投资大师的发表一下.
难道国外投资大师及国内投资大师的投资回酬会比这里的人差吗？
答案是肯定超越这里的所有人包括我在内.

如果是那么容易，股票分析员也不需要做那么多功课呢？
何必浪费公司金钱，公司人力资源?
到不如以毫无意义数字（PE，ROE， NTA， DY， PROFIT MARGIN，CASH IN BANK等）来算出什么股值得买进.
事实摆在眼前，投资不是那么简单.

即使我踊跃加入各国外价值投资论坛，也没有一位百万富翁投资者也不敢说这句话。
因为大家深信投资也是一门艺术缘故，还在学习中.

[ 本帖最后由 ytlcorp 于 2-10-2005 05:14 PM 编辑 ]

最简单的就是“低买高卖”。
问谁可以做得到？

MY1

原帖由 NeverGiveUp 于 2-10-2005 11:14 AM 发表
最简单的就是“低买高卖”。
问谁可以做得到？

这和"高买更高卖"一样都是很少人可以做到。

大多数都是"底买更底卖"或"越底越买越不卖"(纸上亏损不是真的亏，不卖就没亏？）。无论你喜不喜欢听都好，这都是事实。

ytlcorp

要讲这几话（buy low sell high），是非常容易，连３岁小孩都会讲，更何况成年人呢？但是实战是非常困难.为什么呢？

MYI兄说很对.绝对赞成.

ytlcorp

是时候说一说PE
CURRENT PRICE / ANNUAL EARNINGS = P/E RATIO
一共有几种 P/E
1.Trailing P/E
The earnings are the most recently reported quarter, plus the previous three reported quarters. The abbreviation TTM is often used to indicate Trailing Twelve Months. However, it really means trailing four quarters of reported numbers.
2..Forward P/E
The earnings number is the total of estimates for the current unreported quarter and estimates for the following three quarters
3...Fiscal Year P/E
Often you will see P/E as calculated on a particular fiscal year for the company. This may be in a chart or table with P/E's for several future fiscal years shown. When this is done, the current fiscal year may have some actual quarters and some quarters with projections. The future fiscal years are all estimated, of course. For example, in January 2001, FY02 P/E would refer to today's price divided by the total earnings estimated for fiscal year 2002. FY01 P/E might include some actual quarters and some estimated. If the current fiscal year is not complete, the numbers are usually listed as estimates, even if there is only one quarter unreported.
Trailing P/Es are solid numbers.
Forward P/Es can be misleading if estimates turn out to be wrong.Forward P/E's are helpful, especially when paired with the PE/Growth ratio, as this gives a picture of how expensive the stock is relative to its expected future growth. And the future is what the stock market is all about.




[ 本帖最后由 ytlcorp 于 2-10-2005 09:42 PM 编辑 ]

secondbrother

原帖由 葉孤一座城 于 1-10-2005 10:02 PM 发表


请问你犯的错误在哪里？请明言那一支股票让你无法抗拒而又犯错了。

有话请直说。

我不是在看粤语残片。

Did i hurt/offend you?

Did i owe you something? Should i tell you my mistake?

secondbrother

言论自由，思想独立，不要情绪化。

如果你认为我在演戏，请换 channel. 我也没想到你会是我的观众。

葉孤一座城

原帖由 secondbrother 于 3-10-2005 09:28 AM 发表



Did i hurt/offend you?

Did i owe you something? Should i tell you my mistake?

不想讲就不用讲吧，我只是问问而已，想知道清楚啊。既然你不想分享就算了。

何必大动肝火？ 喝杯凉茶下火吧！

secondbrother

喝了凉茶，精神好得多了。

我和 ytlcorp兄 讲了这么多，为了表达什么？？？

1. 很多人买股票，他们只是了解／知道一些数字罢了。他们并不了解自己的风险，他们只是一知半解。

２。投资股票并非如此简单，也不是非常困难。只是一些人把它说得如此简单。只要把钱丢在股市，然后一相情愿的等下去，就可以赚钱了。

有时候换另一个角度看东西，我和 ytlcorp兄 为什么整天在这里扮演 ＂坏人＂ 的角色？？？？

我们只是提供另一种看法，是对是错，其他网友自然有他们的判断。

[ 本帖最后由 secondbrother 于 3-10-2005 02:46 PM 编辑 ]

Kenger

同样的，他也只是提供一种看法。他只是自己试过可行才来这里吃力不讨好的跟大家分享。有必要用＇妖言惑众＇这样的字眼吗？或许你们也可以换另一个角度看东西。大家尊敬他是因为他无私的分享和修养，不是因为他投资功力高超。我想国外的投资者也会尊敬他的行为吧，不管他的投资方法好不好。

secondbrother

你说的对，我收回那句话。